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Evolutionaryargumentsareoftenusedtojustifythefundamentalbehavioralpostulatesofcompetive
equilibrium. Economists such as Milton Friedman have argued that natural selection favors proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms over ﬁrms engaging in other behaviors. Consequently, producer efﬁciency, and
therefore Pareto efﬁciency, are justiﬁed on evolutionary grounds. We examine these claims in
an evolutionary general equilibrium model. If the economic environment were held constant,
proﬁtable ﬁrms would grow and unproﬁtable ﬁrms would shrink. In the general equilibrium
model, prices change as factor demands and output supply evolves. Without capital markets, when
ﬁrms can grow only through retained earnings, our model veriﬁes Friedman’s claim that natural
selection favors proﬁt maximization. But we show through examples that this does not imply
that equilibrium allocations converge over time to efﬁcient allocations. Consequently, Koopmans
critique of Friedman is correct. When capital markets are added, and ﬁrms grow by attracting
investment, Friedman’s claim may fail. In either model the long-run outcomes of evolutionary





assumption of preference maximization by consumers. Why should we assume that ﬁrms are run
to maximize proﬁts rather than something else, or for that matter, why should we assume that they
maximize anything at all? One justiﬁcation for proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms is that non-maximizing
ﬁrms will be driven from the market. We call this the “market selection hypothesis”. Another justi-
ﬁcationisthatowners/shareholderswanttheﬁrmtomaximizeproﬁts(andpresumablyknowhowto
do this and can enforce this discipline on the ﬁrm). This argument two relies on a market selection
argument: inept owners can be proﬁtably bought out by more efﬁciency-minded entrepreneurs. In
this paper we study the market selection hypothesis and its consequences for general equilibrium
analysis. We also investigate selection for owners-shareholders who can recognize and favor proﬁt
maximization over those who invest according to different criteria.
The best-known market selection defense of the proﬁt maximization assumption was offered
byMiltonFriedman, whoargued(Friedman, 1953, p.22): “Wheneverthisdeterminant(ofbusiness
behavior)happenstoleadtobehaviorconsistentwithrationalandinformedmaximizationofreturns,
the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not the
business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources
from the outside. The process of natural selection thus helps to validate the hypothesis (of proﬁt
maximization) or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely
on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.” Alchian (1950)
made similar arguments, as did Enke (1950) who wrote “In these instances the economist can make
aggregate predictions as if each and every ﬁrm knew how to secure maximum long-run proﬁts.”
The intuition offered by Alchain, Enke and Friedman is that eventually capital markets will drive
out ﬁrms that do not maximize proﬁts.
Winter (1964, 1971) and Nelson and Winter (1982) make a different argument for the market
selection hypothesis. A simple version of their argument is that the retained earnings of proﬁt
maximizers will grow fastest and thus they will come to dominate the market. Nelson and Winter
construct a partial equilibrium model in which the “as if” hypothesis of proﬁt maximization
describes the long run steady state behavior of ﬁrms. In their analysis, prices are ﬁxed and all ﬁrms
have access to the same technology. This leads to the existence of a uniformly most ﬁt ﬁrm (or
a collection of identically-behaving ﬁt ﬁrms) selected for by a retained earnings based investment
dynamic.
Thenaturalselectionargumenthasitscritics. Koopmans(1957,p.140)arguesthatreferencing
an external dynamic process to support the validity of a key behavioral assumption is not really
a satisfactory way to proceed: "But if this (natural selection) is the basis for our belief in proﬁt
maximization, then we should postulate that basis itself and not the proﬁt maximization which
it implies in certain circumstances." Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 58.) also understand that
the coevolution of ﬁrm behavior and the economic environment could pose problems for the2
evolutionary defense of proﬁt maximization. Among the “less obvious snags for evolutionary
arguments that aim to provide a prop for orthodoxy” is “that the relative proﬁtability ranking of
decision rules may not be invariant with respect to market conditions.” However, there is no extant
general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of replacing static proﬁt maximization with a
selection dynamic.
We construct a sequential-equilibrium market-clearing model in which a retained earnings
dynamic, much like that discussed by Nelson and Winter, drives the scales of ﬁrm operation. The
model is consistent with standard general equilibrium analysis in that rest points of the selection
process are competitive equilibria, and the resulting allocations are Pareto optima. The questions
we ask have to do with the attainment of the rest points. Starting from arbitrary initial conditions,
will proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms be selected for, and will optimal allocations be achieved?
The answers to these questions demonstrate that Koopmans’ concern is justiﬁed. We show
that defending proﬁt maximization on natural selection grounds so as to be able to invoke the usual
competitive analysis and assert that market outcomes are Pareto efﬁcient is not a satisfactory way
to proceed. We ﬁnd that markets do favor proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, but that producer efﬁcient
outcomes may nonetheless fail to emerge. The fact that markets favor proﬁt maximization does not
entail producer efﬁciency (much less so Pareto efﬁciency) because the selection process may never
settle down and away from the rest points of the selection process, the competitive equilibria, prices
may not lead to efﬁcient coordination of ﬁrms’ activities. The weak link in the natural selection
justiﬁcation for the normative properties of competitive markets is not the behavioral hypothesis of
proﬁt maximization but the implication from proﬁt maximization to Pareto optimality.
To ask if Friedman’s capital markets justiﬁcation works we add capital markets to our model.
If all investors have rational expectations then the addition of a market for one period investments
is sufﬁcient to generate dynamically complete markets. Equilibrium outcomes are thus Pareto
optimal and no selection occurs or is needed. But if expectations are heterogeneous, then markets
are dynamically incomplete. Equilibrium outcomes need not be optimal and we show that the
market need not select for investors with rational expectations. We will see that in a certain sense
the capital-market model is less well-behaved than the market model in which capital is reallocated
only through the retained earnings dynamic.
This study of the connection between “economic ﬁtness” and proﬁt maximization is related
to our earlier work on the market selection hypothesis in ﬁnancial asset markets (Blume and
Easley, (1992)) as well as the work by Sandroni (1997), which relies more heavily, as we do
here, on optimization. The model described here is richer, however, despite the lack of stochastic
shocks, because the real effects of investment decisions make the "ﬁtness landscape" decidedly
more complex than the concave hill of Blume and Easley and Sandroni. In this model we ask
which expectations survive, which ﬁrms survive, and whether constrained equilibrium paths are
asymptotically competitive.
In hindsight the negative answers that we have obtained are not surprising. In order to
sensibly ask questions about evolution the market structure must be incomplete. So the question3
is really whether natural selection can substitute for complete markets. Of course, the incomplete
markets equilibrium will not be a complete markets equilibrium from the start. But the natural
selection conjecture is that from some interesting set of initial conditions (describing ﬁrms’ capital
or heterogeneous investors’ wealths) the incomplete markets equilibrium converges to a complete
markets equilibrium. Given how little structure incomplete markets equilibria have the conjecture
seems incredible.
In the next section we lay out the basic equilibrium model. Firms are owned by capitalists
who choose how much of the ﬁrm’s revenue to leave in the ﬁrm as retained earnings and how much
to consume. Production takes time and ﬁrms input purchases must be ﬁnanced with their retained
earnings. Thus we have a cash in advance constraint and no external market for ﬁnancial capital.
Equilibria in this model are called constrained equilibria. Section 3 demonstrates that the ﬁnancial
capital dynamic induced by constrained equilibrium selects for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms over ﬁrms
following other behavioral rules. The heart of the paper is in the following two sections. In section
4, we examine the connections between our constrained equilibria and competitive equilibria. We
show that if a constrained equilibrium converges the limit is a competitive equilibrium and thus is
Pareto optimal. In section 5, a series of examples demonstrates how constrained equilibria may
fail to converge. The constrained equilibrium path in these examples can exhibit cycles as well
as chaotic behavior. In section 6 a market for ﬁnancial capital is added to the model. If investors
have rational expectations then the market is dynamically complete and equilibrium outcomes are
efﬁcient. But we show the marketneed not select for rational investors in such a way that efﬁciency
is attained. We offer our conclusions in section 7. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2. The Model
This section describes the basic conventions of the model and intertemporal equilibrium without
markets for ﬁnancial capital. Time is discrete, and is indexed by t = 1,2,.... At each date,
the economy has J commodities, and date t prices are non-negative vectors pt ∈ RJ
+. There
are two types of inﬁnitely-lived consumers: “workers” and “capitalists”. Workers are indexed by
i = 1,...,I and have stationary endowments ei ∈ RJ
+/{0} in each period. Capitalists are indexed
by h = 1,...,H and own ﬁrms. The consumption set for both types is some non-negative orthant
C ⊂ RJ
+. All consumers have perfect foresight.
Worker i has utility function Ui(c) =
P∞
t=1 βt





factors, βi and βh, are nonnegative and less than one. The one-period reward functions, ui(·) and
uh(·), are strictly concave, C2 and differentially strictly monotonic on the consumption set C. In
addition, we make the usual assumption about indifference not transversally cutting the boundary
of the consumption set.
AssumptionI: Foreveryconsumer,capitalistorworker,andanysequence{cn}∞
n=1 ofconsumption
bundles such that for good j, cn
j → 0, Dju(cn) → +∞ for all consumption goods j.4
Capitalist h owns ﬁrm h.1 Firms turn today’s inputs into outputs available tomorrow. The
technology for ﬁrm h is described by a production possibility set Th ⊂ RJ. The sets Th are closed
convex cones, that is, technology is convex and exhibits constant returns to scale. We assume that
each ﬁrm h has a uniquely speciﬁed list of commodities that can be used as inputs and outputs. For
ﬁrm h any input-output vector ωh ∈ Th can be written ωh = (ωh−,ωh+), where ωh− ≤ 0 is the
vector of inputs and ωh+ ≥ 0 is the vector of outputs. Our dynamics are driven by the assumption
that production takes time. Inputs ω
h−
t available at date t are used to produce outputs ωh+
t+1 at
date t + 1. For a given price vector p, we will let ph+ and ph− denote the vector of prices for ﬁrm




t is the value of ﬁrm h’s date t inputs and ph+
t+1ωh+
t+1
is the value of ﬁrm h’s date t + 1 outputs.
2.1. Constrained Equilibrium
The set of available intertemporal contracts is constrained. Workers have no opportunities for
lending or borrowing across different dates. Capitalists can transfer resources through time, but
only through their production technology. In each period capitalists receive their ﬁrm’s revenue.
They decide how much to spend on current consumption, and how much to invest in their ﬁrm
to generate tomorrow’s revenues. We assume that the ﬁrm’s input purchases must be ﬁnanced
with this investment of ﬁnancial capital. Thus we have a cash-in-advance constraint on ﬁrms. 2
Speciﬁcally, retainedearnings, orﬁnancialcapital, isusedtopurchaseinputsatdatet. Theseinputs
generate output, and thus revenue, at date t + 1. The portion of this revenue that is retained in the
ﬁrm becomes its new ﬁnancial capital. The economy is initialized by endowing each capitalist with
a stock of outputs ωh+
1 > 0, which can be traded in the ﬁrst period for inputs and other consumption
goods.
We test for the emergence of proﬁt maximization, and therefore we need to allow for a variety






where pt and pt+1 are the prices (for all goods) ﬁrm h faces at dates t and t+1, respectively, and yh
t
is the amount ﬁrm h has to spend on inputs at date t. Decision rules have to satisfy three properties:
1. Production must be feasible: dh(p,q,y) ∈ Th.
2. The ﬁrm’s budget constraint must be met: ph− · dh−(p,q,y) = y.
3. The decision rule is upper hemi-continuous.
1 We do not consider multiple owners of ﬁrms. What is important for our analysis is that the owner(s)
of a ﬁrm want it to maximize proﬁts. With a single owner, perfect competition and a deterministic
world this is clear. With multiple owners we would also need to consider the mechanism determining
payouts.
2 Within our model, this cash in advance constraint is necessary to have ﬁnancial capital play any
role. There may be other interesting ways to model the evolution of ﬁrms, such as durable and
nonreversible investment in physical capital, but we focus on ﬁnancial capital.5
One such rule is constrained proﬁt maximization:
max qh+ · ωh+ − qh− · ωh−
s.t. w ∈ Th
ph− · ωh− = yh
We denote this special decision rule by Dh(p,q,y). Note that it is equivalent to revenue maximiza-
tion subject to the operating capital constraint.
Theconstrainedproﬁtmaximizationdecisionruleexhibitshomogeneity. Ifpricesandrevenues
are rescaled so as to leave the ﬁrm’s budget set unchanged, and output prices are rescaled so that
relative prices of outputs do not change, then optimal production plans do not change. We assume
that each ﬁrm uses a homogenous decision rule.
Deﬁnition 2.1: A decision rule d(p,q,y) is homogeneous if for all positive scalars α and β, and
all prices, price expectations and revenues p, q and y, d(αp,βq,αy) = d(p,q,y).
Equilibrium in this model is a sequence of prices, consumption bundles and production plans
such that consumers maximize utility subject to various constraints, and such that the allocation
is feasible. For each worker, the constraints are the single-period budget constraints. For each
capitalist, the constraints are budget constraints involving the allocation of resources between
consumption and production, and the decision rule. We call equilibrium with behavior as described
above constrained equilibrium. Formally,
























t · (xt − ei) ≤ 0 for all t,
x ∈ C.
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t ) for all t,
and x ∈ C.6















In a standard competitive equilibrium, a consequence of the 0-degree homogeneity of demand and
supply in prices is that the aggregate price level is indeterminate. Constrained equilibrium exhibits
more price-level indeterminacy because consumers and ﬁrms are not free to take advantage of ar-
bitrary relative intertemporal prices. In an economy with homogeneous decision rules, constrained
equilibrium determines relative prices only among commodities available at the same date. The
price level is indeterminate, period by period.




















is also a constrained equilibrium.
Constrained equilibria have an important recursive property, whose proof is an immediate




















t=T for any T.
2.2. Competitive Equilibrium
We are interested in the relationship between constrained equilibria and competitive equilibria.



























t · (xt − ei) ≤ 0,
x ∈ C.
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t+1) ∈ Th for all t.















The competitive equilibrium described here is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium in a private-
ownership economy in which each capitalist owns all of his own ﬁrm and maximizes proﬁt.

















1. Each ﬁrm h maximizes proﬁts: πh∗
t ≥ q∗h+
t+1 w+ − q
∗h−
t w− for all (w−,w+) ∈ Th.
2. Each ﬁrm h earns 0 proﬁts: πh∗ = 0.
The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium presupposes the existence of a market structure
sufﬁcient to transfer wealth across dates and ﬁrms. Constrained equilibrium presupposes that the
market structure is inadequate for this task. Our interest is in whether the dynamics induced by
constrained equilibrium eventually compensates for the lack of complete markets.
3. Selection for Proﬁt Maximizers
The ﬁrst question to ask about the dynamics induced by constrained equilibria is whether proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms are selected for; or, more carefully, whether non-proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms are
driven out of the market. Writers such as Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) have defended
the proﬁt-maximization hypothesis using evolutionary arguments. Winter (1971) and Nelson and
Winter (1982) formalized this intuition in a dynamic model that shares some features with our
model. In particular, in Nelson and Winter’s work proﬁtable ﬁrms grow and unproﬁtable ones
shrink. In Nelson and Winter’s analysis, prices are ﬁxed and all ﬁrms have access to the same
technology. This leads to the existence of a uniformly most ﬁt ﬁrm (or a collection of ﬁt ﬁrms
behaving identically) which is selected for by an investment dynamic similar to ours. But in our
economy, prices are endogenous and ﬁrms do not all have access to identical technologies.
We begin with a general result about the fate of two capitalists with differing ﬁrm decision
rules, utility functions and discount factors. The key to the result is the relationship between the
capitalists discounted marginal rates of return on investment. Along any constrained equilibrium
path, each capitalist sets his marginal rate of substitution between expenditure on consumption at
dates t and t + 1 equal to his discounted marginal rate of return on investment at date t. More
generally, the marginal rate of substitution between expenditure on consumption at dates 1 and T
will be equal to the product of discounted marginal rates of return on investment from date 1 to date8
T. Suppose capitalist h has a uniformly, over time, larger discounted rate of return on investment
thandoescapitalistk; thatis,hfacesamoreattractive,fromhispintofview,investmentopportunity
at each date than does k. Then h’s marginal rate substitution between consumption at dates 1 and
T must grow exponentially relative to k’s. Consumption is bounded above, so marginal rates of
substitution are bounded above. Thus k’s marginal rate of substitution must converge to 0. That is,
the marginal utility of income must diverge for k. So k’s consumption and the ﬁnancial capital of
the ﬁrm owned by k must converge to 0. Of course, k is choosing this path, but nonetheless he is
being driven out of the market by h.
The intuition above uses the Euler equation to describe each capitalist’s optimal path. For
this to be legitimate we need to be sure that the Euler equation is well deﬁned and necessary. Let
ρh(ph−,ph+,y)denotetherevenuesofﬁrmhatinputpricesph−, outputpricesph+ andexpenditure
level y.
Assumption R: For every ﬁrm h,




The ﬁrst condition says that marginal rates of return on investment are well deﬁned. The second
assumption, along with our Inada condition on utility functions (Assumption I), rules out boundary
solutions with 0 investment in ﬁnite time.























= 0 and ck
t → 0.
Theorem 3.1 provides a general characterization of the market selection process. Which
capitalists-ﬁrms survive depends on discount factors and marginal rates of return; but it does not
depend on one-period utility functions. The only feature of utility functions that matters for the













denote average return on investment in period t. Note that for constrained proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms,
ρh
y(ph−,ph+,y) exists and is a constant, independent of y. Thus for a constrained maximizer
ρh
yt = rh
t for all t. To insure that a maximizer drives out a non-maximizer with same discount factor
we need to rule out increasing returns to investment by the non-maximizer.
Corollary 3.1: Suppose that Assumptions I and R hold, and that capitalist h maximizes con-
strained proﬁts and capitalist k uses a decision rule such that ρh









Then the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 still hold.
If both capitalists have the same discount factor, then the proﬁt maximizer, with the higher
average return on investment, drives out the other ﬁrms. This conﬁrms Winter’s (1971) and Nelson
and Winter’s (1982) results in our economy. Notice that this works even if the two ﬁrms are in
different industries, or have different technologies available to them. But if decision rules and
discount factors are correlated in some funny way, then higher discount factors can compensate
for inferior decision rules. The important role of discount factors in driving market selection is
demonstrated in the following corollary, which shows that if two proﬁt-maximizing capitalists
have not too dissimilar long run rates of return, then discount factors determines who survives,
independent of tastes.



















and if βk/βh < 1, then the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold.
From Theorem 3.1 one might suspect that if the one ﬁrm’s decision rule is less efﬁcient than
the “aggregatedecision rule” of the other ﬁrms in the market, then the inefﬁcient ﬁrm will be driven
out and the production side of the economy would operate efﬁciently in the limit. This conclusion
is incorrect however, as the following sections show.
4. Dynamics
The previous section shows that if, among all ﬁrms with the same technology, at least one ﬁrm
belonging to a capitalist with the maximal discount factor maximizes proﬁt then any survivor will
be a proﬁt maximizer. Or, even if none of the ﬁrms proﬁt maximize, the market selects from
among the ﬁrms with a given technology those ﬁrms which are most proﬁtable. The question that
we turn to now is whether the ﬁnancial capital dynamic also insures that each industry operates
efﬁciently. The questions of interest are: If several ﬁrms produce several goods from common
inputs with differing technologies, does the market select for those ﬁrms which are most efﬁcient?
In particular, does the economy eventually operate on the production possibility frontier and does
it eventually achieve a Pareto optimal allocation? If a new ﬁrm enters an industry with an efﬁcient
technology (one that expands the production possibility frontier in a relevant direction) will this
ﬁrm ﬂourish (or is it possible that it will be driven out by the retained earnings dynamic)?
Theanswerstothesequestionsare“no”iftherearenoproﬁt-maximizingﬁrms, oriftheproﬁt-
maximizingﬁrmsbelongtocapitalistswithlowdiscountfactors. Toseethisconsidertwocapitalists10
with the same technology and differing discount factors. If the capitalist with the low discount
factor owns the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm, and if the other ﬁrm has a sufﬁciently high (although not
maximal) average rate of return, then according to Theorem 3.1 the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm would
disappear. In the limit the economy would not be operating on its production possibility frontier.
To rule this phenomenon out, we assume for the remainder of the paper:
Assumption D: i. All consumers have a common discount factor β, and
ii. There is a set of available technologies {Tk}K
k=1. For each technology Tk there
isatleastonecapitalisthk whomaximizesconstrainedproﬁtusingtechnology
Tk.
Unlike the analysis of the previous section the answers to the general equilibrium questions
posed here depend on prices and thus on the evolution of constrained equilibria. To answer these
questions we need to analyze the dynamics induced by constrained equilibrium in more detail. In
particular the relationship between constrained and competitive equilibria is important.
Under rather general conditions, every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Also
under rather general conditions, competitive equilibria will have turnpike properties. We will
place sufﬁcient structure on the economy that competitive equilibria are easily characterized as
stationary after the ﬁrst period. To guarantee this we need to assume that workers endowments are
not consumer goods and inputs are not produced.
Assumption C: There is a partition of the set of commodities {1,...,J} into two sets Inp and
Con such that
1. For all ﬁrms h, if (wh−,wh+) ∈ Th then ω− ∈ RInp and ω+ ∈ RCon.
2. For all i, ei ∈ RInp.
3. C = RCon
+ .
Theorem 4.1: If Assumptions I, C and D hold, then every competitive equilibrium consumption









t=1 is a competitive
equilibrium, then for each i and h, respectively, there are consumption bundles xi and xh such that
xi
t = xi, xh
t = xh for all t ≥ 2.
Non-stationarycompetitiveequilibriumproductionpathsarepossiblebecauseofourassumptionof
constant returns to scale. But the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that every competitive consumption
path can be supported by a competitive equilibrium in which production plans are stationary. We
call such equilibria stationary competitive equilibria.
In a stationary competitive equilibrium, the ﬁnancial capital (the amount spent on inputs) is
constant and because the equilibrium is stationary workers do not save or borrow. If ﬁrms are given
initial ﬁnancial capital equal to the amount spent on inputs in the competitive equilibrium, then the
competitive prices clear markets. Because the ﬁrms have zero proﬁts at these prices, their ﬁnancial
capital is constant. Consequently this competitive equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium. This11
argument is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2: A stationary competitive equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium for some assign-




converge to a competitive equilibrium. Competitive equilibria in our economy are Pareto optimal.
So if a constrained equilibrium converges to a competitive equilibrium the limit equilibrium is
optimal and thus stationary. A constrained equilibrium path is stationary if consumption paths
are stationary, and if each ﬁrms share of total factor costs remains constant over time. We ﬁrst
show that any stationary constrained equilibrium with at least one constrained proﬁt maximizer per
technology active is competitive.










t=1 is stationary if there
exists consumption bundles xi and xh for each worker and capitalist, respectively, and production
plans wh such that the following properties hold for all t ≥ 1: For all workers, xi
t = xi, for all
capitalists, xh
t = xh, and for all ﬁrms, ωh
t = ωh. A stationary constrained equilibrium is interior if
for each technology k, ωhk 6= 0. Finally, a stationary state is locally stable if for any initial outputs
of the ﬁrms (ωh+
1 )H
h=1 sufﬁciently close to (ωh)H
h=1, there is a constrained equilibrium path such
that workers consumptions converge to the respective xi, capitalists consumptions converge to the
respective xh, and production plans converge to the respective ωh.
Theorem4.3: SupposeAssumptionsI,CandDhold. Theallocationresultingfromanystationary
and interior constrained equilibrium is a competitive allocation.
Not all stationary constrained equilibria are competitive. Suppose that there are two technolo-
gies, each used by exactly one capitalist, and that one of the capitalists is endowed with 0 initial
output. Thiscapitalist’sﬁrmcannevergrow, sotheconstrainedequilibriumisstationary, butunless
the non-producing ﬁrm’s technology is redundant, this equilibrium is not optimal and therefore
not competitive. Suppose however that the constrained equilibrium path is initially interior and
converges to a stationary state in which some ﬁrm has zero ﬁnancial capital and is thus inactive.
This ﬁrm must be making loses along the way since it once had positive ﬁnancial capital. If prices
were continuous in ﬁnancial capital stocks it would follow that the ﬁrm would make a loss if it
operated at the limit prices. Thus the ﬁnancial capital constraint would not be binding on such
a ﬁrm. To insure the needed continuity we place an assumption on workers endowments that
guarantees uniqueness of prices. With this assumption we show that every locally stable, stationary
constrained equilibrium is competitive.
It will be convenient to assume that every constrained equilibrium is supported by a price
vector that is unique up to the renormalization described by Lemma 2.1. As a consequence of
our assumptions on preferences this already holds for consumption goods prices because each
consumption bundle is supported by a unique budget line. We could use similar smoothness,
curvature and boundary assumptions on production to guarantee the uniqueness of supporting12
input prices but our examples in Section 5 all involve piecewise linear production. The following
non-degeneracy (ND) assumption has the same effect.








has rank equal to Inp, the number of inputs.
Given the workers’ consumption bundles (xi)I





















Assumption ND implies that for each (xi)I
i=1 and pCon there is a unique pInp which allows all the
budget equations to be met.
Theorem 4.4: Suppose Assumptions I, C, D and ND hold. If a constrained equilibrium is locally
stable, then the limit allocation is competitive.
5. Stability
We know from Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 that if a constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium converges the
limit allocation is competitive. These results support the argument that natural selection leads
to optimality. But in this section we show that the conclusion, that natural selection in markets
implies optimality, is not correct. It fails because the ﬁnancial capital dynamic need not converge,
and because non-steady-state behavior can be far from optimal. The following example shows that
even in a standard economy with a unique competitive equilibrium, ﬁnancial capital stocks need
not converge. We ﬁnd a limit cycle of revenues and a corresponding limit cycle of constrained
equilibria, none of which are competitive equilibria.
In the examples in this section there are two consumption goods x and y, and a single
input good z. We assume that all ﬁrms maximize proﬁts subject to their expenditure constraints.
Constrained equilibrium prices are normalized so that the value of aggregate input purchases in









Both β and ρ are common to all consumers. Consequently, demand at each date aggregates.
Furthermore, one-period indirect utility for a capitalist with income z is logz + φ(pCon), where φ
depends upon ρ. Thus the intertemporal decision problems for capitalists are particularly simple.
The solutions all require that capitalists invest a constant fraction β of their revenues in input
purchases.13
Example 5.1: There are two capitalists and one worker. The worker is endowed with good z
which is used by the ﬁrms to produce x and y. Firm one produces 1 unit of x and 0.1 units of y at
date t + 1 for every unit of z that it purchases at date t; ﬁrm 2 produces 0.001 units of x and 1 unit
of y at date t + 1 for every unit of z that it purchases at date t.
For any ρ this economy has a unique competitive equilibrium with constant relative prices
p∗
z = 1, p∗
x = 0.90009, and p∗
y = 0.9991
and quantities which depend on ρ.
In any constrained equilibrium, capitalists invest fraction β of their revenues in their ﬁrm and
spend the remaining fraction on their consumption. Workers consume the entire value of their















where r = ρ/(ρ − 1) and I is the consumer’s expenditure on consumption. These demands









We normalize prices at each date so that expenditures on inputs always equal 1. Thus at date
t−1, R1
t−1 +R2
t−1 = 1 and so ﬁrm h purchases share Rh







t−1(1,0.1) if h = 1,
R2
t−1(0.001,1) if h = 2.
Recalling that fraction β of the revenues from the sale of these outputs will be used to purchase





t−1 if h = 1,
β(0.001pxt + pyt)Rh
t−1 if h = 2.
Total expenditure on date t consumption has to equal the total wealth of the capitalists, for what the
capitalists do not consume directly they transfer to the workers in return for inputs, and the workers
spend this payment on consumption goods. With our normalization, total capitalist wealth must
equal 1/β. From equation (5.1) and the aggregate budget equation




























Consequently, the ﬁnancial capital dynamic is
xt+1 = R1
t + 0.001(1 − R1
t)
yt+1 = 0.1R1


















We know from Theorem 4.3 that for each ρ this dynamic has exactly one interior steady state and
that this steady state is the competitive equilibrium. If this steady state is locally stable then for
any 0 < R1
1 < 1 the sequence of constrained equilibria converges to the competitive equilibrium.

















So as long as the consumption goods are not too strongly complementary the competitive equilib-
rium is locally stable. But if ρ is sufﬁciently small, less than −1.49, then the unique competitive
equilibrium is unstable.
FIG 1. HERE.
Figure 1 illustrates the map from R1
t to R1
t+1 for ρ = −3. The instability of the steady state
arises because if ﬁrm 1’s purchasing power is a little too large, then the output of good x will be
aboveitscompetitiveequilibriumlevel. Becauseoftheshapeoftheconsumer’sindifferencecurves
this extra output of good x, and corresponding reduced output of good y, will reduce the market
clearing price of good x so much that ﬁrm one experiences a large loss and earnings fall below the
equilibrium level. But when ﬁrm one’s purchasing power is low, the output of good x is reduced
and it has a high price causing ﬁrm one’s revenue to rise above the equilibrium level. When the
goods are sufﬁciently complementary this cycle of proﬁts and losses produces cycles in the levels
of ﬁnancial capital.
Figure2illustratesthebehavioroflimitﬁnancialcapitalstocksasafunctionofρ. Thedatafor
this ﬁgure were generated by iterating the dynamic above starting from an initial ﬁnancial capital
for ﬁrm one of R1
1 = 0.5. For each value of ρ the equilibrium equation system was iterated until
either it was evident that a stable cycle had been reached or until it had been iterated 80,000 times.
For ρ > −1.49 the purchasing power of ﬁrm one converges to its steady state value and the limit
allocation is competitive. For −2.22 < ρ < −1.49 a two-cycle emerges; for −2.44 < ρ < −2.22
a four-cycle emerges; and so on, generating a period-doubling cascade. For sufﬁciently negative
values of ρ this map displays chaotic behavior with the limit purchasing power of ﬁrm 1 varying
from about 0.2 to almost 1. As a result of this instability, the economy never achieves a Pareto
optimal allocation.
FIG 2. HERE.15
A ﬁrm caught in a two-cycle is making a loss in one period followed by an offsetting proﬁt
in the next. If there was a market for ﬁnancial capital, and if investors had perfect foresight, they
would never put their capital in ﬁrms that would be unproﬁtable. We consider the ability of capital
markets to resolve this problem in Section 6. For now we note that Example 5.1 demonstrates
that for some economies the internal capital market induced by having proﬁtable ﬁrms grow and
unproﬁtable ones shrink is not sufﬁcient to achieve optimality.
In Example 5.1 no Pareto optimal allocation is ever achieved. Nonetheless production does
take place on the boundary of the economy’s aggregate production possibility frontier. Pareto
optimality fails only because the “right” mix of commodities is never produced. With only two
ﬁrms, inefﬁcient production cannot occur as no matter how ﬁnancial capital is allocated, the
resulting allocation must be on the production possibility frontier. But with three or more ﬁrms
even producer-efﬁciency can disappear. In the following example all efﬁcient ﬁrms vanish.
Example 5.2: Now there are four ﬁrms: Firm 1 produces 1.0 x and 0.1y from 1 unit of z; ﬁrm
2 produces 0.05x and 1y from 1 unit of z; ﬁrm 3 produces 0.9x and 0.15y from 1 unit of z; and,
ﬁrm 4 produces 0.3x and 0.7y from 1 unit of z. Calculation of the efﬁcient frontier shows that
the production processes used by ﬁrms 3 and 4 are dominated by combinations of those used by
ﬁrms 1 and 2. Thus efﬁcient production requires that only ﬁrms 1 and 2 operate. For any ρ there
is a unique competitive equilibrium, in this equilibrium ﬁrms 3 and 4 do not produce and this
equilibrium corresponds to a steady state of the dynamic with only ﬁrms 1 and 2 having positive
ﬁnancial capital.
FIG 3. HERE.
For sufﬁciently small ρ the steady state is unstable. Figure 3 shows the time path of ﬁnancial





1 = .0025. In this example ρ = −11. The graph shows a sequence of transitions from
two efﬁcient ﬁrms almost at the steady state, to two efﬁcient ﬁrms and an inefﬁcient ﬁrm almost in
a two-cycle, to one efﬁcient and one inefﬁcient ﬁrm almost in a two cycle, to one efﬁcient and two
inefﬁcient ﬁrms almost in a two cycle, to two inefﬁcient ﬁrms almost in a two cycle, and ﬁnally to
two inefﬁcient ﬁrms in a four cycle.
The result of Example 5.2 is particularly disturbing from the point of view of entry of efﬁcient
ﬁrms. Consider an economy in which only the two "inefﬁcient" ﬁrms 3 and 4 exist. Example 5.2
shows that the ﬁnancial capital dynamic for this economy has a stable four-cycle. Now suppose an
entrepreneur discoversthetechnology ofﬁrm1. Thistechnologyexpandstheaggregateproduction
possibility set and would be used in any competitive equilibrium. If the entrepreneur begins with
little ﬁnancial capital, he will lose it. Actually, simulations show that even if he begins with a large
initial ﬁnancial capital, say R1
1 = 1/3, he will lose it. The inefﬁcient ﬁrms drive out the efﬁcient
ﬁrm.16
6. Financial Markets
Capitalists would like to invest only in those ﬁrms which they expect will earn the highest rates
of return. In the model analyzed in the previous sections capitalists do not have this opportunity.
Now we add a market for investment in ﬁrms and a market for loans. We assume (for now) that all
consumershaveperfectforesightaboutfuturepricessothattheymakecorrectinvestmentdecisions.
Loans made by consumers at date t are denoted li
t and have a gross rate of return of Rt+1 at
date t + 1. Loans are in zero net supply so the market clearing condition is that their sum across
all workers and capitalists is zero. With access to consumption loans, both workers and capitalists
can transfer income over time. To insure that the present discounted value of each consumers
expenditures on consumption is no more than the present discounted value of his income we
require that asymptotically the present value of loans is nonnegative.
Each capitalist also has the opportunity to invest his savings in any ﬁrm he chooses. Firms
use this investment as they used the investment of their owners in the previous model: To purchase
inputs today in order to produce output and thus revenue tomorrow. This revenue is paid out to
the investors with each investor getting a share of the ﬁrm’s revenue equal to the share of ﬁnancial
capital that he provided. Formally, at each date t capitalist h decides how much to spend on current
consumption ptxh
t , how much to loan out lh
t and how much to save for investment in ﬁrms sh
t . The
capitalist invests fraction αh
k t of sh






t . The rate of return between periods t and t + 1 on this investment in ﬁrm k is
r∗














The deﬁnition of an equilibrium with ﬁnancial markets is an extension of the deﬁnition of
constrained equilibrium to include loans by consumers and investment by capitalists in other
capitalist’s ﬁrms.

















with pt ∈ RJ
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(ii) For all t: p∗























(ii) For all t, p∗









αk t = 1, αt ≥ 0, st ≥ 0.








































h=1,k=1 are given such that each whk∗+











Aside from the details of the loan markets, this deﬁnition differs from the previous constrained
equilibrium deﬁnition in that here a ﬁrm is not owned by a single capitalist, and in that here the
economy must be initialized by distributing ownership shares of pre-existing production among
capitalists.
In a rational expectations constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium only those ﬁrms that offer the
maximal rate of return on investment will receive any funds. So no inefﬁcient ﬁrms will ever
operateifforeachtechnologyatleastoneﬁrmwithaccesstothetechnologymaximizesconstrained
proﬁt.
The following theorem shows that this system of markets — spot markets for consumption
loans and ﬁnancial capital — is dynamically complete if all consumers have rational expectations.
If consumers have rational expectations, then all equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal.
Theorem 6.1: Suppose Assumptions I, C, and D hold. Any rational expectations constrained
ﬁnancial equilibrium is Pareto optimal18
6.1. Evolution and Optimality with Dynamically Incomplete Markets
In a rational expectations constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium no selection over ﬁrms (other than
the trivial and immediate selection at the beginning of time) occurs so this is not an appropriate
structure in which to ask about selection for proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. However, with the ﬁnancial
markets described above inefﬁcient ﬁrms may attract investment if some investors do not have
rational expectations. In this case, the selection question shifts from direct selection over ﬁrms to
the effect on ﬁrms of selection over investors with differing expectations. The interesting questions
are: Will investors with rational expectations be selected for? Will this cause inefﬁcient ﬁrms to
eventually disappear? Will the economy converge to a rational expectations equilibrium?
The deﬁnition of rational expectations constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium has rational expec-
tations built into it but an extension to allow for differing expectations is easy. When a consumer
makes his consumption, savings and investment plans he does so at each date using whatever
expectations he has at that date about future prices. These expectations may be conditioned on any
information that the consumer has. This information is all publicly available information, current
and past prices, as well as the consumers own past choices and his current wealth. A worker’s
decision problem yields consumption and savings decisions at each date. A capitatlist’s decision
problem yields consumption, savings and investment choices as well a choice among the set of
available production plans for his ﬁrm at each date. The market clearing conditions for inputs and
outputs at each date are unchanged. We will refer to an equilibrium with ﬁnancial markets when
some consumers may not have rational expectations as a constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium.
Whether or not rational expectations are selected for depends on what is meant by "rational
expectations". There are (at least) two possible deﬁnitions. “Rational expectations” is a con-
straint on investors’ beliefs. The ﬁrst candidate constrains beliefs in equilibrium, but not outside
equilibrium. These expectations can be viewed as either forecasting a particular price sequence
or as using a forecasting rule mapping observable information into predicted prices, but in either
case, there are no constraints on forecasts from data that are not generated in equilibrium. We
call these expectations "narrow sense" rational. We say that capitalists have narrow sense rational
expectations if there is a constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium for some distribution of wealth that is
a rational expectations constrained ﬁnancial equilibrium. The second candidate is expectations
that are correct both in and out of equilibrium. That is, expectations that always forecast correctly
regardless of the behavior of other traders. We call such expectations "wide sense" rational.
Individuals with narrow sense rational expectations need not forecast prices correctly in an
economy in which some individuals have incorrect expectations. Thus they may make inferior
investments and their share of wealth need not converge to one. As a result the economy need
not become even asymptotically efﬁcient. We addressed a closely related question in Blume and
Easley (1982) where we showed that rational expectations equilibria need not be locally stable
under a simple learning dynamic.
Example 6.1: To see how selection can fail even with ﬁnancial markets we add ﬁnancial markets
to the economy of Example 5.1. In that example there are two technologies each producing a mix19
of the two output goods from a single input. Any allocation of input to these two ﬁrms results
in a point on the production possibility frontier. So to make production inefﬁciency possible we
also add a third dominated technology. Technology three produces 0.8 times as much as does
technology 2 from a unit of input. This economy has a unique rational expectations constrained
ﬁnancial equilibrium (RECFE) with constant input and output prices, pz = 1,px = 0.90009 and
py = 0.9991, and a constant gross rate of return on loans, Rt = 1/β. All consumers discount at
rate β, so with constant goods prices and a gross rate of return on loans of 1/β the loan market
does not operate. The constant outputs and the share of ﬁnancial capital that is invested in ﬁrms 1
and 2 is a function of the utility parameter ρ. Firm 3 offers a lower rate of return than does ﬁrm 2
and so it never operates. We assume that ρ = −3.0. The RECFE share of ﬁnancial capital that is
invested in technology one is 0.533305 and the resulting outputs are (x,y) = (0.5338,0.5200).
Suppose that all workers, and capitalist one, always forecast the RECFE prices. Thus they
have narrow sense rational expectations. Capitalist two is irrational. He believes that prices will
be constant over time but he does not forecast the rational expectations prices. Exactly what prices
he forecasts do not matter (because of the form of his utility function), all that matters is how he
chooses to allocate his savings between the ﬁrms. We assume that he always invests share 0.875
of his wealth in technology one and the remainder in technology three. Because all consumers
forecast constant prices, and discount at rate β, the loan market clears with no trade at a constant
gross rate of return of 1/β. Goods prices will vary with the wealth of the capitalists because of
capitalist two’s irrationality. The economy will be in a RECFE, and thus achieve a Pareto optimal
allocation, only when capitalist one has all of the wealth. When the wealth of capitalist one is 1/β
he must invest share 0.533305 of his wealth in technology one and the remainder in technology
two in order to support a RECFE. At any other wealth level his expectations and allocation of
wealth between the two efﬁcient ﬁrms is not tied down by the narrow sense rational expectations
hypothesis.
Because capitalist one always forecasts the RECFE prices he believes that the rate of return on
investment in either efﬁcient ﬁrm is 1/β and that the rate of return on investment in the inefﬁcient
ﬁrm is less than 1/β (as it is in a RECFE) so he is indifferent over investment shares between ﬁrms
oneandtwo. Weassumethatwhenhehaswealthwheinvestsshare0.5(sin(2π+0.0666594w/β)+1)
of it technology one and the remainder in technology two. This rule has the property that when
capitalist one has all of the wealth in the economy, w = 1/β, the share invested in technology one,
0.533305, supports the RECFE. Other than the price forecast and allocation at wealth share one
the structure of this rule is not tied down by the narrow sense rationality hypothesis.3
If capitalist two has all of the wealth in the economy then the allocation of ﬁnancial capital is
incorrect and the equilibrium allocation is not a RECFE allocation. If capitalist one has all of the
wealth then he invests correctly, the rational expectations prices are realized and the allocation is
3 Only two properties of this rule matter for our results. First, at some wealth share less than one
for the rational capitalist the two capitalists invest so as to have equal rates of return and at this
wealth the slope of capitalist ones allocation rule is positive. Second, at wealth share one the rational
capitalist invests so as to support the RECFE and at this point the slope of the rule is positive.20
the RECFE allocation. The question is what happens if initially both capitalists have some wealth.
Figure 4 illustrates the map from the wealth of capitalist one at time t to his wealth at time
t + 1 for an economy with β = 0.9. This equation of evolution has ﬁve steady states, but only
two of them are locally stable. The steady state in which capitalist one has all of the wealth is
one of these locally stable steady states. But its basin of attraction is tiny. Only if the initial
wealth of capitalist one is at least 1.109 (a wealth share of 0.998) will his wealth share converge to
one. To see why this is the case note that as capitalist one’s wealth falls from 1/β he invests less
than the RECFE fraction in technology one and correspondingly more than the RECFE fraction
in technology two. Capitalist two invests fraction 0.875 (more than the RECFE fraction) of his
small wealth in technology one and the rest in the dominated technology. The result is that less
than the RECFE fraction of total wealth is invested in technology one and thus the rate of return
on technology one is greater than on technology two. For wealth of capitalist one below 1.109
capitalist two has a greater rate of return on his investments than does capitalist one and so two’s
wealth share grows. Finally, as Figure 4 illustrates no other wealth levels are mapped into a wealth
for capitalist one of 1.109 or more.
The other interesting locally stable steady state occurs at wealth 0.1639 for capitalist one. At
this wealth for capitalist one the two capitalists have the same rate of return on investment–thus
a steady state of the wealth dynamic. More important is the fact that this steady state is stable;
the derivative of the wealth dynamic is −0.1222 at 0.1639. To see why note that if capitalist one
has slightly more wealth than 0.1639 he will invest a bit more than 0.875 of it technology one. In
aggregate, technology one is being allocated too much capital so the rate of return on investment




At the interior locally stable steady state in Example 6.1 the rates of return on the two efﬁcient
technologies differ by a factor of about ten. It may seem that the rational capitalist should notice
this difference and thus begin to invest more in technology two. We could change his rule to
incorporate this idea by requiring that when he has wealth of 0.1639 he invests only in technology
2. Of course if he does so then the rates of return and resulting optimal investment choice will
change. Making simple modiﬁcations of this sort to the rational capitalist’s investment rule will
not solve the "problem"–that the evolution depends on expectations out of a rational expectations
equilibrium. The following example provides an economy in which there is no obvious change in
the narrow sense rational expectations that would make the capitalist better off.
Example 6.2: Suppose that ﬁrm 3 in Example 6.1 produces 0.001 units of good x and 0.05 units
of good y from one unit of input. Everything else in that example is unchanged. Now the map
from the wealth of the narrow sense rational capitalist at one date to his wealth at the next date is
given by Figure 5.21
FIG 5. HERE.
This economy has two interior steady states: one at w = 0.6511 and one at w = 1.1025.
Neither are locally stable. The only locally stable steady state occurs when the rational capitalist
has all of the wealth. The basin of attraction for this steady state is [1.1025, 1
β]. Again unless the
rational capitalist begins with nearly all of the wealth the economy will not converge to a REE.
Figure 6 provides plots of the time paths of the rational capitalist’s wealth from two initial
points: One in the basin of attraction of the REE and one just outside it. The dark band in the
ﬁgure corresponds to the meta-stable region where the slope of the equation of evolution is nearly
one. This region is not stable, but transitions through it are very slow.
In this economy unless the narrow sense rational capitalist begins with nearly all of the wealth,
or none of it, prices are chaotic. Now it is far from obvious how the narrow sense rational capitalist
should change his behavior in order to make better investments.
FIG 6. HERE.
Alternatively we could require a rational capitalist to always invest optimally. To do so he
would have to be able to predict rates of return when the economy is not in a RECFE. Thus he
would have wide sense rational expectations. If we assume that rational capitalists have wide sense
rational expectations then convergence to a CFE is assured. In fact, it is easy to show, using Euler
equation arguments similar to those in the proofs of our theorems in Section 3 that investors with
wide sense rational expectations will be selected for. More carefully, if there is at least one investor
with wide sense rational expectations and a discount factor as large as any other discount factor
in the economy then this investor will survive and prices will converge to rational expectations
equilibrium prices. The following example shows how this occurs and why it is not interesting.
Example 6.3: Suppose there are four ﬁrms using two technologies. Each technology is employed
by one proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm, ﬁrms 1 and 3, and one non-maximizing ﬁrm, ﬁrms 2 and 4. Each
technology produces one good, and both goods are desired by consumers. Suppose there are two
capitalists with equal discount factors, one of whom has wide sense rational expectations. The
rational investor will always invest in the proﬁt maximizing technologies, consequently his share
of total investment will grow relative to the investor investing in non-maximizing ﬁrms. It can be
shown using Euler equation arguments that the share of investment belonging to the investor who
invests in non-maximizing ﬁrms converges to 0. Thus, in this example, investors with “bad beliefs”
are driven out.
But investors with incorrect beliefs who nonetheless always invest in proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
need not be driven out. Suppose that capitalist one has wide sense rational expectations and that
capitalist twoknows the true rate of return to investment in ﬁrm 1, but underestimates all the others.
Only ﬁrms 1 and 3 receive any investment funds. We can show that their proﬁtability must be
identical after some ﬁnite number of dates. Furthermore this happens as soon as investor one, the22
rational investor, is wealthy enough that making all his investment in ﬁrm 3 is enough to guarantee
that its rate of return is less than ﬁrm 1.
But how is this maintained? Capitalist two invests all his money in ﬁrm 1, and capitalist one,
the rational investor, allocates his money between ﬁrms 1 and 3 so as to guarantee equal rates of
return. Suppose now far off in time, after this steady state is reached, capitalist two changes his
investment rule so that in every 13th period he places all of his investment in ﬁrm 3. If capitalist
one leaves his investment alone, ﬁrm 3 will earn less than ﬁrm 1, so investing in ﬁrm 3 would
contradict the wide sense rational expectations hypothesis. If capitalist one invests everything he
has in ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 1 will earn a lower rate of return than ﬁrm 3, which is also inconsistent with
wide sense rational expectations. Consequently, capitalist one must adjust his investment every
thirteenth period so as to just offset capitalist two’s behavior.
The wide sense rational expectations hypothesisrequires that “rational investment” be respon-
sive to the investment of irrational actors. We believe that this kind of information requirement
is inconsistent with the spirit of competitive analysis. To assume that in any economy there is at
least one capitalist who always correctly forecasts endogenous prices begs the question of how
a capitalist whose behavior is so carefully tuned to the structure of the economy, including the
behavior of any irrational capitalists, could arise.
7. Conclusion
We have investigated the market selection hypothesis — the hypothesis that markets favor the
survival and growth of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms — in a fairly special general equilibrium model.
Nonetheless we believe that the lessons our analysis teaches hold quite generally.
First, there are market processes, such as our retained earning dynamic, that encourage the
growth of more proﬁtable ﬁrms at the expense of less proﬁtable ﬁrms. If these processes are
a dominant force in the economy, this would seem to justify the use of the proﬁt maximizing
hypothesis in equilibrium analysis as Friedman argued. However, other market forces may work
against the selection of proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
Second, and more importantly, we show that this defense of the use of the proﬁt maximization
hypothesis leads to welfare conclusions at odds with the orthodox welfare analysis of competitive
economies. Our model is constructed to insure that any stable steady state of the ﬁnancial capital
dynamicisacompetitiveequilibriumandisthusParetooptimal. However, weﬁndthatequilibrium
paths need not converge at all. In fact, we show through examples that they can exhibit complex
dynamics. The resulting path of allocations is not in any sense optimal. Although our model
is speciﬁc the forces responsible for this lack of convergence are not special. The key to our
conclusion is that we study the evolution of ﬁnancial capital in a full equilibrium model. It is of
course true that at each date the ﬁrms that are most proﬁtable grow the fastest. However, the is
no reason for any ﬁrm to be uniformly more proﬁtable than another ﬁrm unless the two ﬁrms use
the same technology and one does not maximize proﬁts (this generates the ﬁrst conclusion). So
as prices evolve, as they must because the allocation of ﬁnancial capital is evolving, ﬁrms using23
technologies that are not on the production possibility frontier and which would therefore not be
used in a competitive equilibrium can be more proﬁtable than "efﬁcient’ ﬁrms. The resulting
endogeniety of proﬁtability can produce cyclic and even chaotic equilibria.
We view our analysis as showing that Koopmans’ cautionary remarks about the use of natural
selection as the basis for proﬁt maximization are correct. We show that it is simply not appropriate
to argue for proﬁt maximization on the basis of natural selection and then replace natural selection
by proﬁt maximization in either static or dynamic equilibrium analysis. It may be that proﬁt
maximizing behavior is a useful hypothesis, but the usefulness of natural selection as a defense of
proﬁt maximization is very limited.
Inthispaperwehaveinvestigatedselectionforproﬁtmaximization anditsuseingeneralequi-
librium analysis inan economy without stochastic shocks. Duttaand Radner (1996) demonstrate in
an uncertain world that ﬁrm decision rules which maximize long run survival probabilities are not
those which maximize expected proﬁts. Studying market selection with uncertainty is particularly
interesting because when proﬁts are random, and the ﬁrm cannot be valued through arbitrage, it
is unclear what objective to attribute to a ﬁrm. It is not obvious that capitalists would agree on
expected proﬁt maximization or on any other objective for the ﬁrm. In this case it is particularly
interesting to see what behavioral rules the market selects for. We conjecture that, just as the
investment market of Blume and Easley (1992) favors those rules with higher expected log returns,
constrained equilibrium paths for an economy with uncertainty will favor those ﬁrm decision rules
with higher expected log revenues.
8. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Multiplying price vectors by positive scalars leaves the workers’ budget
sets unchanged, so their demand is invariant to the change in prices. The same is true for
capitalists. To see this, consider a plan (xt,ωt)t≥1 in capitalist h’s budget set. First observe
that, for ﬁxed ω+
t, the set of affordable (xt,ω
−
t ) pairs is invariant to the proposed change in scale























for j = h,k, where mt is revenue at the beginning of period t, zt is consumption expenditure, yt
is expenditure on inputs and v(p,z) is the capitalist’s one-period indirect utility function evaluated24
at prices p and expenditure on consumption z. The Euler equation is necessary because of





























































yτ converges to 0. Then the left hand side of the ﬁnal inequality
converges to 0. Since consumption is bounded from above along any equilibrium path, the
numerator of the right hand side is bounded away from 0. Consequently the denominator of the
right hand side must be converging to +∞, and so ck
t converges to 0.
Finally, we need to show that capitalist k’s share of input purchases goes to 0. Suppose not.
Then there is an  > 0 such that inﬁnitely often he can purchase at least fraction  of the aggregate
endowment. Since preferences are strictly monotone, in any such period he could use it to produce
a consumption bundle that would give him utility δ > 0 were he to consume it himself. If he carries
out this plan at some date far in the future, its utility exceeds the continuation utility of the optimal
plan with ck
t → 0. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Consider equation (∗) in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For the proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm h, ρh
yt = rh























and the rest of the argument follows as in the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: If both ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers, then ρi
yt = r
j
t, and the result now
follows immediately from Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: In equilibrium, utility maximization for workers implies that
P
t qtei <










denote the equilibrium allocation, and consider the allocation










τ . For all t ≥ 2 and for





τ. This allocation is feasible. If
the equilibrium consumption plan is not stationary, this allocation is also Pareto preferred, which
is a contradiction.






It follows from Theorem 3.1 that all active ﬁrms maximize constrained proﬁts, but it remains
to show that all active ﬁrms maximize (unconstrained) proﬁts. Output price ratios are constant and
the level is falling at rate β. Consequently the value of each capitalist’s output falls at rate β. But,
due to piecewise linearity, the capitalists problem does not restrict input prices. However, since
the output prices are falling at rate β, it follows that the value of each consumer’s consumption
falls at the same rate. Since each worker’s budget constraint is satisﬁed, the value of each worker’s
endowment falls at rate β. Consequently the value of aggregate expenditures falls at the same rate.
Since each capitalist’s share of input expenditure is constant, each capitalist’s input expenditures
falls at rate β.
We turn now to the decision problem of a typical capitalist. This capitalist is spending amount
zt on consumption and yt on inputs in period t. Let r = pt+1ω+
t+1/ptω
−
t denote the gross rate of
return on a dollar invested in the ﬁrm at time t. (We have already seen that this number is constant
through time). Constrained proﬁt-maximization implies that each ﬁrm is run so as to maximize r.







s.t. for all t yt + zt = mt,
mt+1 = ryt,
m1 > 0given,
0 ≤ yt ≤ mt,
where v(p,z) is the capitalist’s indirect utility function for the one-period problem. The Euler
equation is
vz(pt,zt) = βrvz(pt+1,zt+1).
From the 0-degree homogeneity of indirect utility and stationarity,
vz(pt,zt) = βrvz(pt+1,zt+1) = rvz(β−1pt+1,β−1zt+1) = rvz(pt,zt).
Assumption I implies that vz > 0, so r = 1.26
The proof of Theorem 4.4 requires a result about the continuity properties of constrained
equilibrium.























t=1 is a constrained equilibrium, and
(ii) β−(t−1)λtpt converges to p∗.
Proof: Consider the consumption goods price sequence {kpCon
t k−1pCon
t }∞
t=1. Then the con-
sumption goods prices all lie in a compact set. Any sub-sequential limit supports each x∗
i and x∗
h.
From our assumptions on preferences there is a unique such consumption goods price vector of
length1. CallitpCon∗, andobservethatthesequenceofconsumptiongoodspricespCon
t converges
to the ray deﬁned by pCon∗. Assumption ND implies there is a unique pInp∗ which solves the
workers’ budget constraints when consumption goods prices are pCon∗ and consumptions are xi∗.
Upper hemi-continuity of the solution correspondence for linear equations implies that pInp∗ is the




t=1. Taking λt = βt−1kpCon










t=1 is a constrained equilibrium such that, in addition to the







t=1 is a constrained equilibrium. Finally, renormalizing prices
as per Lemma 2.1 gives (i).
















t=1 denote a constrained equilibrium whose
allocation converges to the stationary allocation. According to Lemma 8.1, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that β−(t−1)pt converges to p. We will refer to the stationary equilibrium
and the converging equilibrium, respectively.
For each worker and capitalist, β−(t−1)ptc
j
t is converging to a limit zj, and for each capitalist,
β−(t−1)ptω
h−
t converges. The argument of Theorem 4.3’s proof shows that all active ﬁrms are
proﬁt maximizing and earning 0 proﬁts. It remains only to show that a vanishing ﬁrm could not
make positive proﬁts if it became active in the limit.














where zt is the expenditure on date t consumption goods and rh
t is the gross rate of return on a
dollar invested in ﬁrm h for one period at date t. Since indirect utility is homogeneous of degree27















The price sequence β−(t−1)pCon











that is, the long run gross rate of return on investment in ﬁrm h is 0.







t converges to rh = βpConωh+/pInpwh−, the
rate of return for ﬁrm h in the stationary equilibrium. If ﬁrm h is inactive in the stationary
equilibrium, it is vanishing in the converging equilibrium. But if rh > 1, then for t large enough,
rh
t > 1, which contradicts the conclusion of the previous paragraph, that the long run gross rate of
return on ﬁrm h investment is 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We show that in a rational expectations CFE markets are dynamically
complete and all operating ﬁrms maximize (unconstrained) proﬁts. Thus the equilibrium allocation
is a complete markets competitive equilibrium allocation (Def. 2.3) which is Pareto optimal by
the ﬁrst welfare theorem. By Assumption D there is, for each technology, at least one ﬁrm that
maximizes proﬁt. All capitalist have rational expectations so clearly no non-maximizing ﬁrm will











t=1 be the optimal plan for
capitalist h. Consider the plan (ˆ xh
t ,αh∗
t , ˆ sh
t , ˆ lh
t )∞
t=1 which agrees with the supposed optimal plan at
all dates other than t and t+1 and has: ˆ lh
t = lh∗
t −1, ˆ sh
t = sh∗
t +1, ˆ xh
t = xh∗










j t+1 for each good j. This plan is clearly feasible and has a higher
value than the supposed optimal plan. So r∗
t ≤ R∗
t.
Now suppose that at some t, r∗
t < R∗
t. Then clearly sh∗
t = 0 for all capitalists h. Then
ωk∗+
t+1 = 0 for all ﬁrms k. Then by Assumption B, k pC∗
t+1 k= ∞. So r∗
t ≥ R∗
t.
















t = 0 for all k,t.
Proof: For any inactive ﬁrm proﬁts are clearly 0. Suppose that ﬁrm k is active. Then from
























So in a CFE with rational expectations, all constrained proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms are unconstrained
proﬁt maximizers.
Workers i’s CFE budget set can be written as:







t−1 for all t,







Deﬁnition 8.2: The complete markets budget set for worker i is:










t · (ei − xi
t) ≥ 0}.
Lemma 8.4: Bi(p∗,R∗) = ˆ Bi(p∗,R∗) for all workers i.
Proof: (1) B ⊂ ˆ B. Let xi ∈ ˆ Bi(p∗,R∗). Deﬁne zi
t = p∗





























Thus xi ∈ Bi(p∗,R∗) and is supported by the consumption loan sequence li.
(2) ˆ B ⊂ B. For any xi ∈ B there is a consumption loan sequence li satisfying the constraints in














t · (ei − xi
t).
Thus xi ∈ ˆ B.
By the observation that all active ﬁrms in period t earn rate of return r∗
t and by Lemma 8.2
the CFE budget set for capitalist h with rational expectations can be written as:











for all t ≥ 1,mh







Deﬁnition 8.3: The complete markets budget set for capitalist h is













Lemma 8.5: Bh(p∗,R∗) = ˆ Bh(p∗,R∗) for all capitalists h.
Proof: See the proof of Lemma 8.4.
As each consumer faces the competitive budget set, and each ﬁrm maximizes unconstrained










for all i. So the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.30
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